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Abstract: 
The reforms and privatisation programmes of the 1990s structured the Russian oil industry 
around a few large national and private companies. This organisational structure poses some 
questions in respect of the Russian authorities will to take back the oil sector. Three factors 
may explain this evolution. First, the Russian authorities want to ensure the long-term future 
of the oil industry by encouraging new strategies in exploration. Second, the government can 
use the oil sector to support economic growth. This would involve sharing out the rent in a 
different manner. Third, and it is e new but important factor, the State intends to use Russia’s 
oil power in this international relationships with the United States, Europe and Asia (China, 
Japan, South Korea, and India). The future of the Russian oil industry has some importance 
for the stability of the international oil market. Could Russia produce 12 Mb/d and 
challenging the dominant position of the Saudi Arabia?  
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The reforms and privatisation programmes of the 1990s structured the Russian oil industry 
around a few large national and private companies within a network of complex power 
relationships with the Federal State and the Regions. Since 2004, the evolution of this model 
has casted doubt on the durability of such a structure. In terms of production and export, 
Russia is a decisive player in the international oil markets. However, the decline in output 
observed in 2008 following the slowdown in growth of 2005 and 2007 has rekindled the 
debate not only on the long-term outlook for Russian oil production and its contribution to the 
balance of world markets, but also on the country’s economic growth. The question we should 
be asking is whether or not the drop in Russia’s output is simply related to the current 
economic climate or if it is symptomatic of changes of a more structural nature. 
 
The main aim of this article is to underline the fundamental principles of the new Russian oil 
policy, those that will structure its future organisation. Our conclusion is that the changes 
brought about under the wing of the Russian authorities do not seem to be aimed at calling 
into question the main objective of an oil industry in line with the principal logics, 
coordinating mechanisms, standards and rules of a market economy. It is in the approach 
itself that there seems to be innovation. From now on, the State intends to exercise stricter 
control over this industry by relying on a private sector which would be closely linked with a 
public sector, and which would respect the “national interest” as defined by the government. 
The failure of the reforms, especially with regard to setting up a clearly defined and secure 
system of private ownership rights, implies the need for a different development model for 
rent industries from that of a system of private holdings dominated by banks. 
 
There are three main reasons why the Russian authorities want to take back the oil sector. 
First, they want to ensure the long-term future of the oil industry by encouraging greater 
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investment in exploration. This would bring an end to the overexploitation of existing 
deposits. In this respect, the lack of transparency and uncertainty in the institutional 
environment in Russia has until now cast serious doubt on the capacity of the State to regulate 
rent industries through classic market mechanisms, from the point of view of both taxation 
and access to resources. Other logics are therefore necessary. The State seems to choose an 
“hybrid governance” of the hydrocarbons sector, in which it remains, in the final instance, the 
authority that coordinates rights concerning the disposal of assets. Second, the government 
can use the oil sector to support economic growth, which is largely dependent on the 
hydrocarbons sector. This would involve sharing out the rent in a different manner (more in 
favour of the State). Third, given the tensions observed in the hydrocarbon markets, the State 
intends to use Russia’s oil power as an international political tool in its relations with the 
major powers of the United States, Europe, China and Japan. In contrast with the situation 
over the last ten years, the Russian State now wants to harmonise its oil policy in accordance 
with the means it effectively has at its disposal and the economic and institutional constraints 
resulting from its transition to a market economy.  
 
These three objectives are not incompatible with a redistribution of the oil rent between 
different private groups and clans that are close to or useful to the Russian government. The 
conflicts surrounding the merger of Gazprom and Rosneft (2005) are an indication of the 
various power struggles affecting the reorganisation of the Russian oil industry. They show 
that the methods of sharing oil revenues adopted in the 1980s under the presidency of Boris 
Yeltsin are being challenged. 
 
1. The revival of the Russian oil industry 
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As part of the “liberal” approach to transition developed by the Washington Consensus(1) 
Russian oil industry reform was intended to produce a new organisational model based on 
different private enterprises. The idea was to redefine ownership rights through vast 
privatisation programmes, while trying to stimulate competition by breaking up the old Soviet 
hierarchies. But this reform has not removed the uncertainties about the future of this 
industry, despite considerable production increases since the end of the 1990s. In particular, 
the industry has to deal with the major challenge represented by the necessary development of 
oil-rich Eastern Siberian in light of the gradual depletion of the major deposits in Western 
Siberia.  
 
1.1 Restructuring of the oil industry in the 1990s 
 
The profound restructuring that took place in the 1990s led to the emergence of an oligopoly 
structured around three main groups which replaced the hierarchical centralised organisation 
of the Planned Economy(2). The first, which accounts for most of the country’s oil production 
(72.6% in 2003), is formed by private industrial and financial groups. It is made up of five 
large vertically integrated companies responsible for production through to distribution: 
Lukoil, Yukos (at least until the end of 2004), TNK (now TNK-BP) and Surgutneftegaz 
account for 65% of production and over 50% of crude exports. This concentration of the oil 
industry was brought about by the vast merger movement that took place in the late 1990s 
when Lukoil acquired 100% control of KomiTek, Yukos acquired 54.2% control of VNK, 
TNK and Sibneft acquired equal shares in control of Slavneft, and TNK acquired control of 
Sidanko. Following the Loans for Shares programme of 1995(3), most of the shareholders in 
this group were Russian banks, with nevertheless a fundamental distinction between the 
companies held by banks “outside” the group (Yukos, Sibneft, TNK-BP) and the companies 
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held by “insiders”, that is the banks created by the holding companies themselves (Lukoil, 
Surgutneftegaz).  
 
The second group is made up of small or medium-sized companies that are not vertically 
integrated. The last and more heterogeneous group is made up of integrated or non-integrated 
companies majority-owned by the State (for Rosneft and Slavneft until 2002) or by regional 
governments (Tatneft, Basneft, etc.). Their share in production however is marginal, with 
Rosneft accounting for 4.8% of production in 2003 (cf. Table 1).  
Table 1 : The main Russian oil companies and the composition of their capital  
 
 Companies Production : Mb/j, 2003 Crude oil 
exportations :Mb/j, 
2004 
Private vertically 
integrated companies 
   
Yukos 1,6 0,6 
TNK-BP 1,2 0,58 
1. Group owned by Bank 
Sibneft 0,6 0,2 
Lukoil 1,6 0,59 2. Group owned by 
insiders  Surgutneftegaz 1,1 0,41 
Total  6,1 2,38 
Majority State or 
Region ownership  
   
- State Rosneft 0,4 0,1 
Bashneft 0,2 - - Regions 
Tatneft 0,5 0,23 
Total - 8,4 3,7 
Source : Petroleum Argus, 28 February 2005, p. 2. 
 
During the period of restructuring of the Russian oil industry, production dropped 
considerably, with reductions of 5.3 Mb/d between 1987 and 1998. However, since the end of 
the 1990s, its spectacular recovery (7.1 Mb/d in 2002, 8.4 Mb/d in 2003 and 9.2 Mb/d in 
2004) might suggest that a new development phase is opening up in the wake of the reforms. 
The slowdown in the oil output growth (9.65 Mb/d in 2006, 9.87 Mb/d in 2007) and the first 
annual decline in output in 2008 (9.71 Mb/d) are rekindling the debate about Russia’s 
contribution to world oil supply. 
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1.2 Uncertainties concerning Russian oil production in the medium term 
 
Forecasts for 2020-2030 show the scale of the uncertainty surrounding Russian output, with 
estimates varying between 9 and 11.9 Mb/d for 2020, and between 9.7 and 12 Mb/d for 2030, 
depending on the scenario (see Table 2). The latest official forecasts (Energy Strategy 2030 
endorsed in 2009) place output at 10.7 Mb/d for 2030, equivalent to an average annual growth 
rate between 2008 and 2030 of no more than 0.4%. The IEA has also made a drastic revision 
to its forecast for 2030. According to the latest World Energy Outlook (IEA 2009) Russian 
output will be only 9.0 Mb/d by 2030 in contrast to the 10.6 Mb/d forecast in the WEO of 
2004. 
 
This outlook in terms of production will naturally have repercussions in terms of exports. 
According to the available “Russian” scenarios, exports could vary between 6.8 and 8.1 Mb/d 
by 2020, and 6.3 and 7.3 Mb/d by 2030. These low projections, whether for 2020 or 2030, are 
likely to have a significant impact on the balance of the international markets, and this despite 
a slowdown in world demand linked to the current economic crisis. 
 
Table 2 : Estimates of Russian oil production 
Mb/d 
 
 2010 2015 2020 2030 
WEO, 2009, IEA  9.2  9.0 
WEO 2008, IEA  10.4  9.7 
WEO 2004, IEA 10.4   10.6 
Makarov, 2007 10.2 10.6 10.6 10.6 
Energy Strategy 2030, 
approved in 2009 
   10.6-10.7 
Project of Energy Strategy 
2030, (Bushuev 2007) 
    
- Inertia scenario 10.0 10.0 10.0 9.8 
- Raw energy scenario 10.3 10.6 10.9 10.8 
- Innovative scenario 10.3 10.6 10.7 11.4 
Institute of Energy Strategy, 
2008 
    
- Innovative 10.2 10.9 11.3 10.8 
- High level hydrocarbon prices 10.3 11.2 11.9 12.0 
 6
- Ecological oriented scenario 10.3 10.9 11.2 10.7 
Institute of oil & gas geology 10.0 10.6 11.0 12.0 
Energy Strategy 2020     
-Optimistic variant 9.8 10.1 10.4 - 
- Moderate variant 8.9 9.0 9.0 - 
- Critical variant 7.2 - 6.3 - 
 
Sources: IEA, World Energy Outlook (Paris, OECD, 2009); IEA, World Energy Outlook (Paris, OECD, 2008); 
A. Gromov, A. “Strategic development of the Russian gas industry for the year 2030”, Séminaire. Le futur 
des marches du gaz en Europe. LEPII, Grenoble, 24 April 2009; P. Hanson, “Russian energy policy and the 
global crisis”, Energy Economist, 336, October 2009, pp. 5-7  
 
 
2. Renewal of reserves: a matter of growing concern 
 
The significant differences between the various estimates bear witness to the uncertainties 
characterising the Russian oil industry despite the sweeping reforms of the 1990s. The factors 
that have enabled production to increase since the beginning of the 2000s are disappearing. 
Future increases in output (or even maintenance of present levels) will depend on 
implementation of development policies different from those that have driven the revival of 
this industry. Consequently, this new approach will require other types of strategies from the 
main private actors in this sector. 
 
2.1 The period of intensive exploitation of existing deposits 
 
Most of the additional output of the last few years can be attributed to two main sources: oil 
that was not extracted during the transition period in the 1990s (in 1994, 28% of Russia’s oil 
wells had ceased production), and oil left in the ground because of the extraction practices of 
the 1980s. In other words, the increase has come from the rehabilitation of existing deposits(4). 
Thus, the additional 2.4 Mb/d produced between 1999 and 2003 came from deposits already 
being worked at the end of the soviet era. But taken as a whole, Russia’s hydrocarbon 
deposits currently in production are 50% depleted(5)  
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The strategy of maximising production and thus of rehabilitating (the most profitable) 
deposits during the Soviet era was accompanied by very low investment in exploration, riskier 
strategies and longer time frames. Investment in exploration has been falling steadily since the 
early 1990s(6). Despite individual differences among them, vertically integrated companies 
have invested very little in exploration. Between 2000 and 2002, less than 2% of investments 
made by Yukos and Sibneft were in exploration. In the case of TNK, this figure was 5%(7). 
Only Surgutneftegaz and Lukoil have maintained a real strategy of investment in the 
exploration of new oil-rich areas(8), which they did even during the period of reorganisation 
 
- Cash stripping 
 
This situation was brought about by the behaviour of actors born of the privatisation 
movement. These companies have adopted a short-term strategy of seeking immediate 
liquidity by maximising exports in order to rapidly increase the value of current assets. This 
strategy is known as cash stripping. The strategies of vertically integrated companies are 
characterised by two aims: maximisation of exports, which is a way of obtaining a much 
higher unitary income than that obtained from domestic sales, and its corollary, maximisation 
of production. The substantial increases in oil production over the last three years enabled 
Russia to boost its exports from 2.90 Mb/d in 2000 to 4.98 Mb/d in 2004 (4.43 Mb/d in 2007), 
although exports to Europe have always been high despite the decline in production between 
1990 and 1998.  
 
- Significant differences  depending on the type of vertically integrated company 
 
Such strategies expose the development of the oil resource to stripping practices, particularly 
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when the main shareholders of these private companies are “outside banks”. The essentially 
financial rationale of these private groups means that their sole concern is financial 
performance, their aim being to increase the value of their shares. Management of the oil 
industry is thus extremely unbalanced, with investment being made in enhanced recovery 
techniques to produce oil from the most accessible resources at the expense of a balanced 
drilling programme(9). Companies have increased their reserves essentially through asset 
stripping made possible by operating huge mergers and creating an extremely concentrated 
industry. Yukos is the best example of this type of development. This company’s increase in 
production (0.8 Mb/d between 1998 and 2004) has been achieved through use of enhanced 
recovery techniques to extract oil from the most profitable deposits, while at the same time 
35% of its oil wells have closed and investments in exploration are now among the lowest of 
the Russian oil companies. Furthermore, Yukos has made extensive use of the tax reduction 
schemes set up by the Federal Government and regional authorities. 
 
2.2 Probable long-term effects 
 
Even if we do not wish to enter into the debate over the true extent of Russia’s estimated 
reserves, a few comments should be made(10). While there is no denying the productivity gains 
from re-opened wells, the problem of ensuring the efficient management of existing reserves 
must be addressed. In fact, the increase in output seems to have been achieved without any 
control from the Russian authorities concerning the conservation of deposits. 
 
If Russian oil production is to increase, or even be maintained at its present level, new 
production capacity and thus considerable investment will be needed. Two factors in particular 
are likely to be problematic in this respect. First, the proportion of total proven reserves in all 
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explored reserves, has dropped considerably (categories A + B in the Soviet classification), 
falling from 67.8% in 1958 to only 26.5% in 2000(11). From the mid-1990s, additions to 
reserves have no longer exceeded production, in contrast to the situation during the Soviet era. 
And although in 2005 and 2006 additions were once more in excess of production, this was 
mainly due to the reassessment of the potential of developed oil fields in the light of new 
technologies(12). And second, according to the IEA, 60% of these proven reserves are in the 
“difficult to recover” category(13). The low level of exploration since the beginning of the 
1990s raises questions concerning the start of production in the new oil-rich areas in light of 
exhaustion of deposits in the large Western Siberian basins. The country has potential 
production areas(14), namely in Eastern Siberia, the northern territories (Timan Pechora and the 
Komi Republic), and offshore with Sakhalin (15). Despite the significant reserves, the 
contribution of these regions to oil production (except the Vankor’s field(16)) is marginal, 
around 4% for Eastern Siberia. This development will require investment and therefore 
considerable financial commitment given the production conditions (climate, geographical 
constraints, long distance between points of consumption and production areas, low population 
density, geological complexities) which are much more difficult than those in Western 
Siberia(17). 
 
3. Unexpected results of privatisation 
 
A key question still remains unanswered today: why has privatisation failed to achieve its 
stated aim of creating a more efficient and balanced (to ensure its long-term future) oil 
industry in Russia? Why has privatisation led Russian oil companies to adopt short-term 
strategies? The principal goal of reform was to create Western type private enterprise and so 
encourage the development of management methods and behaviour in the oil industry that 
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were more efficient than those prevailing in the Soviet Centrally Planned Economy. 
Privatisation was based on two main logics: organisational reform centred on a principle of 
vertical integration in order to determine the optimum boundaries of a company, along with a 
redefinition of ownership rights through privatisation. 
 
3.1 Uncertainties surrounding ownership rights  
 
The short-term strategies of oil companies, and particularly the lack of investment in 
exploration, stem from the unexpected results of a privatisation process that has taken place in 
an institutional environment characterised by weakness of the Rule of Law. Despite a reform 
programme aimed at establishing a clearly defined and secure system of ownership rights, 
these rights are still subject to considerable uncertainty. Privatisation of the oil industry has 
essentially attenuated the former Soviet system of ownership rights, giving holders of private 
ownership rights temporary and partial access rights to asset ownership(18). So the investment 
strategies adopted by Russian oil firms in the 1990s can be explained by the institutional 
architecture of this industry. They resulted more specifically from the incompatibility between 
the “liberal oil model”(19), born of the reforms and focussing on private property rights, and 
the Russian institutional environment. 
 
- Right to sell assets is coordinated by the State  
 
Privatisation of the hydrocarbons sector has led to lack of security concerning the right to use 
assets. First, privatisation processes have been widely perceived as illegitimate. The purchase 
of shares at rock-bottom prices, the lack of tendering procedures, participation of banks in 
auctions they themselves have organised and won, and the failure of the successful bidders to 
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realise the investments they were supposed to realise in the company all bear witness to the 
lack of transparency surrounding these privatisations(20). Second, manipulation of the 
bankruptcy law linked to the weakness of the rule of law (in other words the way in which the 
law is applied) has taken away the traditional function of the bankruptcy process and made it 
into a tool for stripping(21). In such conditions, the State does not feel bound to respect 
ownership rights, as would happen in market economies, the Yukos affair being a good 
example of this. When Yukos was negotiating the sale of 40% of its shares to ExxonMobil in 
2003, the State blocked the transaction knowing that the transfer of strategic assets was at 
stake.  
 
- Uncertainties over access rights to resources 
 
Despite a legal framework based for the most part on Western standards and rules, the way in 
which exploration and development licences are granted is creating extreme uncertainty over 
access rights to Russian oil resource. In order to rapidly reorganise and privatise the oil 
industry, most of the licences granted to companies were not subject to a tendering procedure, 
as required by law. This practical approach gave a kind of legal recognition to the exploitation 
of deposits that the Soviet Union had de facto granted to production associations that were 
used as the basis for creating holdings(22). But at the same time, it offered the State the 
perfectly legal option of reallocating certain licences. This shows that it was hardly 
appropriate to transpose the most advanced institutional models of market economies to the 
Russian environment of the early 1990s. 
 
- Certain doubts surrounding the right to income from ownership 
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the quota system for gaining access to the Transneft 
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transportation network, and thus to export markets, limits access to revenues (particularly in 
hard currency) given the considerable difference between domestic market prices and those of 
export markets. In theory, oil companies have had the right to export 25% of their production. 
In practice, some of the most powerful (Lukoil, Yukos) have been able to “bargain” for much 
higher percentages while other companies have been unable to access the Transneft network. 
The discretionary practices of Transneft (depending on the objectives of the State) are 
creating an unstable environment for Russian companies and making any kind of contractual 
relations largely ineffective. 
 
3.2 Sharing the oil rent: a battle between the State and the major companies 
 
The weakness of the formal market institutions has stood in the way of operation of classic 
market economy mechanisms with respect to the State’s retribution as owner of underground 
natural resources. In the 1990s, the state was unable to persuade private operators to takes its 
own interests into consideration(23) through the use of classic market economy incentives like 
tax regimes.  
 
Inspired by practice in Western economies, Russia’s fiscal regime is organised around two 
main taxes. The first one concerns the mining of mineral resources (Mineral Extraction Tax) 
and imposes a tax akin to a royalty, based on the value of the oil production. The second is a 
tax on exports. A further tax is levied on profits (see Box 1).  
 
Box 1: Main characteristics of Russia’s oil sector taxation policy  
 
Russia has two principal oil taxes: 
- the Mineral Extraction Tax, of the order of $17.40 per barrel, 
- and an export duty that varies with the international price of crude oil. 
Today, oil companies pay between 75 and 80% of their revenue in taxes. These high levels of taxation 
are often quoted as one of the reasons for the lack of investment from oil companies, especially in 
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areas where production costs are high such as Eastern Siberia, offshore fields and the Yamal 
peninsula. 
Given this situation and the urgent need to renew investment in exploration, the government has 
agreed to a certain number of tax breaks. The main ones are: 
- a “tax holiday” for oil companies developing offshore fields (for 15 years), fields of East Siberia (for 
10-15 years) and the fields of Timan Pechora and the Yamal (for 7 years). 
- the mineral extraction tax would be applied only above the threshold of $15 per barrel compared with 
9 at present.  
- a zero export tax for certain fields in Eastern Siberia. A list of oil fields has already been approved by 
the government. It could be lengthened to include other fields. No details have yet been released on 
when this tax break will be introduced or for how long it will be effective. 
 
The export duty remains unchanged, although different rates could be introduced according to the 
quality of the petroleum products. However, since adjustments should reflect oil price trends they 
would be made more rapidly to avoid having the highest tax rate at the moment when prices fall. 
 
Sources: “Petroleum Moscow Urged to Clarify Output Policy”, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 22 September 
2008; “More tax breaks for offshore fields”, Argus FSU Energy, 31 July 2009 ; “Russia redesigns fiscal policy to 
boost oil E&P”, Oil and Gas Journal, 20 April 2009, p. 18-21 ; “More fields lined up for zero duty”, Argus FSU 
Energy, 20 November 2009 ; “Duty calls”, Argus FSU Energy, 5 February 2010. 
 
The tax system is a vital tool in the hands of the state for influencing the strategies of oil 
companies. In Russia, it has not really provided the economic incentives needed to persuade 
players to help the state achieve its objectives.  
 
In the first instance, the State does not exercise efficient control over its tax revenues (Box 1). 
It is struggling to get the large industrial groups to pay their tax debts. The most powerful 
vertically integrated companies have thus been able to develop a wide variety of tax evasion 
schemes. The extremely complex structure of certain vertically integrated companies makes it 
possible to practise transfer prices(24). This internal pricing system(25) is seen as a way of 
reducing the tax burden from hydrocarbon sales through offshore subsidiaries of oil 
companies established abroad. Transfer prices also provide a way of limiting tax pressure in 
that crude oil prices are undervalued(26). The extreme use by some companies (Yukos, Sibneft, 
TNK) of the tax exemption schemes set up by certain regional authorities (regions of 
Chukotka, Mordovia and Kalmykia) is part of this logic. The authorities thus organise 
“offshore zones” within their regions and play a very significant role in these tax evasion 
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schemes.  
Second, the State is incapable of setting up an effective taxation system based on the quality 
of deposits. Compared with the tax regimes in place in market economies such as Norway or 
the UK, it seems in many respects to be fairly basic or at least to pay little attention to the 
particular exploration and development conditions of the various oil fields (especially 
differences in costs related to geographic location and geological conditions). Given its 
particularities, Russia’s oil taxation system has offered very little in the way of incentives to 
induce oil companies to commit themselves to the higher-risk investments required for 
developing areas with the most adverse production conditions. Yet differentiation is essential 
to stimulate exploration(27). But perhaps the State is not in a position to specify in detail the 
exploration and production licences to be granted, since it does not have the necessary 
information. Information asymmetry between the State and Russian oil companies is 
particularly marked in this area. Furthermore, in a context marked to a greater or lesser extent 
by corruption, it would probably be very difficult for the State to implement an elaborate 
system of differentiated taxation. The use of a single tax, irrespective of the quality of the 
deposits, at least has the merit of simplicity and, to a certain extent, prevents large-scale fraud.  
 
4. Why does the State want to regain control of the hydrocarbons industry?  
 
The need to orient strategies toward investment in exploration in order to conserve oil 
resources, a desire to contribute to maintaining high international prices and to redistribute the 
oil rent to provide a basis for economic growth are factors justifying the State’s determination 
to regain control of the hydrocarbons sector. An analysis of the institutional context reveals a 
vital requirement: This new oil arrangement must be compatible with Russia’s current 
institutional endowment (where market institutions are in their infancy, where the Rule of 
 15
Law is difficult to implement and where privatisation has not produced the desired 
behaviour). The State must now define a coherent, centralised oil strategy to serve its goals 
both at home and abroad. 
 
4.1 Will taking back control of the oil industry provide a way out of the “institutional 
deadlock”? 
 
The State must attempt to find a way of getting the oil industry out of the “institutional 
impasse” in which privatisation has more or less locked it. The development of strategies to 
enable more balanced management of the Russian oil industry is crucial for its long term 
future. In the Russian institutional context, more or less, this must involve better management 
of oil production growth (slower?), greater investment in exploration than in the past, and 
stricter State control over reserves in order to guarantee renewal. A revival of the reform 
process might have been seen as a way of getting out of this institutional impasse. But such a 
revival will only come from a compromise between the various interest groups, notably 
between the State, the large vertically integrated companies and the Regional authorities. In 
fact, for a wide variety of reasons, it seems that neither the Regions nor the oil companies 
have any interest in following this path or in strengthening the market institutions(28). The 
Russian oil companies have to a great extent tried to maintain a certain opacity in the way 
they operate in order to ensure that the rent continues to be shared out in their favour. In 
particular, it was important for them to avoid any legal provision that would imply greater 
transparency (in term of information) and compliance with fiscal regulations, which may 
explain the strong opposition from certain Russian companies, notably Yukos, to the 
production sharing agreement regime(29). The weakness of the Rule of Law, which allows 
legal and fiscal regulations to be circumvented and market institutions to be manipulated is 
something that the dominant actors do not want to see disappear, insofar as the uncertainty 
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and lack of transparency in the institutional environment enables them to conserve their 
gains(30). 
 
- Hydrocarbons at the service of the economy 
 
The State must also arrange with the oil companies for a new way of sharing out the 
hydrocarbon rent so that this sector can be used to help achieve the economic growth 
objectives announced by Vladimir Putin. The rent industries must feed the State budget more 
substantially, in particular via the tax regime, while Russian growth remains largely driven by 
international hydrocarbon prices. In a study carried out in 2002, J. Rautava showed that a 10% 
rise in the price of oil would lead to an additional 2.2% increase in GNP (31). According to a 
recent World Bank report, only high oil prices have in the past enabled Russia to achieve 
economic growth of over 5.5%. In this context, international prices will have to remain fairly 
high and Russia must therefore avoid contributing to a possible period of decline in 
international prices by exporting excessively large amounts of oil. 
 
In addition, Russian oil output is certainly not insensitive to crude oil price levels. In fact, all 
the “optimistic” production scenarios are based on relatively high prices on international 
markets. In particular, the gradual shifting of “core” production to Eastern Siberia could lead 
to a substantial increase in production costs(32). Consequently, the future of Russia’s oil policy 
is largely tied to a policy in favour of defending prices. It is important therefore for the 
Russian State to be able to maintain control over oil company export strategies. 
 
- Reinforced control of the oil industry without large-scale nationalisation  
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Today, the Russian State is seeking to strengthen its control of the hydrocarbons sector while 
avoiding total re-nationalisation of the oil industry. The State holds 30 % of the Russian oil 
production with a huge modification of the oil industry structure (Table 3). In our opinion, the 
final objective of a hydrocarbons industry whose organisation and regulations are in 
conformity with those of a market economy is not called into question as the deregulated 
trading in Gazprom shares would tend to suggest. Nevertheless, the government’s position 
might appear ambiguous in the sense that it is trying to reconcile contradictory goals. The 
challenge is thus to create a system that maximises efficiency through private management 
while allowing tighter State control in order to set up a market economy that will probably be 
more in line with Vladimir Putin’s vision of Russia’s place and role on the international 
scene.  
Table 3 : The main Russian oil companies (in production) in 2008 
 
 Oil companies Output in Mb/d 
Lukoil 1.89 
TNK-BP 1.38 
Surgutneftegaz 1.24 
Slavneft (50 private, 50 public) 0.39 
RussNeft 0.29 
 
 
Private companies 
Yukos 0.18 
Rosneft 2.17 
Gazprom  0.98 
 
Companies in which state has 
majority stake  Incl. GazpromNeft 0.73 
Tatneft 0.52 Regional companies 
Bashneft 0.23 
Others (including PSAs)  0.44 
Total  9.71 
Source: From “Russia’s Output Surge Slows To a Crawl”- PIW, 28 January 2007, p. 3. 
 
Stricter conditions of access to Russian natural resources and the State’s desire to exercise 
tighter control over this access are the first important signs that the central authorities are 
regaining control of the sector(33). The State’s discretionary reallocation of exploration and 
development licences to companies in which it is the main shareholder (Rosneft, Gazprom)(34) 
or which benefit from State support (Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz), and re-examination of the 
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conformity of a certain number of licences concerning major deposits, are part of this 
movement(35). This renewed control is also being achieved at the expense of the Regions, 
which in the past had considerable power in the industry. The 2003 amendments to the 1992 
Subsoil Law give the Federal Government (the Ministry of Natural Resources) exclusive 
control over granting exploration and development licences. Regional authorities simply have 
a consultative role, whereas in the past they had joint power with the Federal Government to 
allocate licences(36). A list has been drawn up of so-called strategic fields for which 
exploration and development licences are to be awarded directly by the state without the 
tendering procedure required by the law (gas law of 2006)(37). Under the law on foreign 
investment in strategic industries that was adopted in May 2008 a private foreign investor can 
hold no more than a 10% share in a hydrocarbons firm, or 5% if the foreign investor is a state-
controlled company. For greater participation, special permission must be granted by a 
commission headed by the prime minister(38). 
 
The final form of the new organisation of the oil industry that the Russian authorities wish to 
establish has not yet been completely defined. It will depend to a large extent on the current 
conflicts between the various pressure groups, on the need to adapt to market rules and on 
Russia’s foreign strategy. Pressure will come in particular from international oil companies 
that wish to gain access to Russian resources, from the United States, from the European 
Union (to which Russia has always been a major hydrocarbons supplier), from Russia’s desire 
to become part of the world economy (the G8, WTO). The new role that Vladimir Putin’s 
government intends to give to hydrocarbons in the country’s relations with its major partner 
countries will also be an important factor. One major question arises. Will there be one or 
several companies in which the State has majority control(39)? Will Gazprom and Rosneft be 
at the centre of the arrangement? The presence of two state-owned companies makes this 
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model highly original, all the more so since these national companies could actually be 
competitors in numerous projects. Last, the role that foreign investors will be allowed to play 
is a major unknown. Even if foreign oil companies are not excluded, they will very likely be 
subject to restrictions or at least to the approval of the highest authorities in the country (see, 
for example, the case of Shotkman where Total and StatoilHydro operate alongside 
Gazprom). 
 
Finally, the government intends to maintain control over the exports of the Russian oil 
companies. This means reinforcing its control over export networks via Transneft, a State-
owned company(40). Rivalry between Transneft and the Russian oil companies over pipeline 
routes implicitly involves the important stake of the export capacity of these oil companies. It 
is a question of restricting, as far as possible, the construction of private pipelines that would 
be owned by the oil companies. 
 
4.2 International aspects of the Russian oil strategy (41)  
 
In addition to developing the oil sector, the policy of the Russian authorities appears to be 
increasingly aimed at setting up a coherent centralised strategy that instrumentalises the sector 
henceforth considered as providing a “comparative advantage” in international competition. 
At the international level, in a context where world energy supply is strongly constrained, 
Russia can use not only its oil but more importantly its gas resources to play a major 
geostrategic role with respect not only to the European market, where it has a determining 
influence, but also to the major Asian countries (Japan, China, South Korea), and even the 
North American market. The Russians are seeking to exert their influence through a strong 
presence in the supply sector for the large European and Asian markets.  
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 Gazprom has now clearly established its intention of defining a truly global strategy(42). It is a 
matter of maintaining or even increasing its market share in the European Union and 
positioning itself on the Asian and even the US markets. On the one hand, Russia can play on 
competition between Europe and Asia in its role as a reliable source of supply for liquids and 
natural gas alike. On the other, it is also tending to bring the major Asian players into 
competition with one another in its programme to develop the resources of Eastern Siberia. 
The differences between China and Japan concerning the first Russian oil pipeline to Asia are 
an example. Today, the decision of the Russian authorities to choose the Japanese option via 
Nakhodka, without excluding the possibility of a branch to China, clearly shows the 
ambiguity of the Russian government’s position. These developments are accompanied by 
bilateral oil supply agreements between China and Russia. Thus, the Chinese company CNPC 
has advanced a payment of $6 billion in exchange for supply of crude oil from Rosneft until 
2010. This source of financing would seem to have facilitated Rosneft’s purchase of 
Yuganskneftegaz. If the Chinese really played a key role in Rosneft’s acquisition of Yukos’s 
subsidiary, this would be the sign of a new power relationship emerging on the Asian energy 
scene. It is also important to underline the new relations that India is establishing with a few 
large Russian oil companies and in particular its interest in participating in the Sakhalin LNG 
development projects. 
 
Furthermore, with the globalisation of the natural gas markets, Russia can undoubtedly aspire 
to a decisive role in price formation for this commodity. In a context where there are tensions 
in world oil supply (and even gas supply in the case of the United States), Russia undoubtedly 
has a trump card to play in the context of the proposed “strategic partnerships”. 
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From this point of view, hydrocarbons represent a structuring element in the country’s foreign 
policy with CIS members, its “near abroad”, but also with the southern European countries 
and those of Eastern Europe. The major Russian energy companies must be the principal 
vectors of this strategy, through a policy of internationalisation. Gazprom and Lukoil are 
increasing their presence in these areas by securing holdings in companies undergoing 
privatisation or through joint ventures(43). This is particularly true in central Asia and the 
Caspian region, which enhances the complementarities (rather than the oppositions) between 
these two zones. The numerous agreements signed between Russia and Kazakhstan, 
particularly with regard to the transport of Kazakh oil through Russian territory, the “calls” 
from Russia to coordinate the oil policy of the two countries(44), demonstrate the extent to 
which the Russian State intends to “reinvest” the economic space of central Asia and expand 
its influence in the region(45). This international policy could also explain the redeployment 
and multiplication of the interventions of the Russian oil companies (close to the State) in 
other oil producing regions, notably in the Middle East and North Africa(46). 
 
*** 
 
The State’s attempt to regain control of the oil sector is an important new factor in the 
development of the oil industry, as it could lead to greater control over production, oil exports 
and renewal of resources. This recent combination of public and private forms of governance 
in the industry can be seen as an attempt to get out of the institutional deadlock in which this 
sector has found itself since the privatisation movement. It reflects the incapacity of the State 
to regulate a rent industry via the classic institutions of a market economy, whether they be 
tax regimes or regulations governing access to resources and development of deposits. 
Privatisation alone has not allowed consolidation and security of ownership rights. The major 
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private players have had an interest in maintaining institutional uncertainty in order to 
increase their share of revenues.  
 
This renewed control also raises a number of crucial questions. While the final goal is to set 
up a market economy that is totally integrated in the world market, a transition phase is now 
opening up. The conditions and form of this control have yet to be defined, particularly 
concerning the creation of a large hydrocarbons company with majority public capital. The 
general configuration of the oil industry and the room given to international investors remain 
major unknowns. Finally, can this hybrid model, a sort of third option, serve as a form of 
governance for the hydrocarbons sector in the transition phase and enable Russia to become 
truly integrated into G8 and the WTO? 
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